Introduction
Managing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from nuclear reactors has become one of the most pressing technological and environmental challenges of our time. The enormous difficulties and the extreme demands linked to SNF management have turned the SNF issue into an 'Achilles' heel' of the nuclear power industry (Tiggemann 2004) . Current attempts to let nuclear power play an important role in combating climate change and oil vulnerability, as widely pursued in the world, may well be brought to an abrupt end if the SNF issue is not solved. These circumstances have also made SNF a favourite target for anti-nuclear groups, which, with varying degrees of success, have sought to portray SNF and nuclear waste as issues that can most probably never be resolved in a safe way -and which therefore form the most fundamental argument against nuclear power as an energy source.
The historical evolution of SNF decision-making in Western Europe and North America is already fairly well-known. For the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, and in particular the Soviet Union, we know less. There have recently been several good studies of Soviet nuclear power history (e.g. Schmid 2004 , Josephson 2005 ), but none of them has gone into any depth when it comes to SNF, but rather focused on nuclear power reactors, public acceptance, the role of the media, etc. There are also several good overviews available in English (Bradley 1997; Yegorov 2000) and in Russian (Kuznetsov and Nazarov 2006) that problematize the radioactive legacy of the Soviet Union, including the SNF and waste issue, but these studies do not address the historical dynamics and evolution of SNF management over a longer period of time; in other words, they fail to explain how and why the present state of affairs have actually come into being.
The aim of this paper is to provide historical insight into the dynamics of SNF decision-making in the Soviet Union, from the origins of nuclear engineering in the 1930s to the collapse of the country in 1991.
A theoretical point of departure for this paper is that nuclear power plants, reprocessing facilities, SNF and waste storages, nuclear weapons, etc., have to be analyzed not as a set of independent technologies, but rather as a system. This is to say that the SNF issue will have to analyzed in parallel to developments within nuclear reactor design and construction, armament and disarmament, R&D in the field of transportation of nuclear materials, etc. In other words, we have to address SNF management as a part of the 'nuclear fuel cycle' and analyze how it influences and are influenced by other activities in this cycle. To emphasize the importance of the systemic aspect, I suggest not to use the common term 'nuclear fuel cycle', but rather the notion of 'nuclear fuel system'. Apart from its analytical convenience, the notion of 'system' is arguably less value-laden than the word 'cycle', with the latter often being criticized by anti-nuclear groups for its implicit suggestion that it is possible to 'recycle' uranium completely and thus bring everything back to an 'original' state. The nuclear fuel system, then, can be described as a large technical system with a variety of interrelated components. The system is 'large' both because it involves key links between geographically disperse activities, and because it involves a variety of technologies, organizations and people that influence the dynamics and evolution of the system. Soviet SNF history is of particular interest in this context, with a nuclear fuel system that was the most complex in the world. The USSR was a pioneer within nuclear power and developed a variety of reactor designs and technologies for uranium mining, conversion and enrichment, as well as for transport, treatment, storage and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. It explored both military and civil uses of the atom, and an enormous amount of people and organizations were involved in realizing highly ambitious nuclear programmes. The USSR is of special interest as a case that can shed light on how SNF handling evolved in a militaristic and totalitarian political setting. The emergence of 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' in the late 1980s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, moreover, provides us with a unique opportunity to study the effects of revolutionary political changes on SNF decisionmaking.
Conceptually, it is important to point out that managing SNF is not the same as managing radioactive waste. Radioactive waste is a broader concept than SNF, as it includes a variety of waste that does not stem from nuclear fuel. Conversely, not all SNF is regarded as a form of radioactive waste. On the contrary, SNF has often been regarded as a valuable resource, forming the basis for the production of new nuclear fuel, nuclear weapons and other civil and military products. Looking at the SNF discourse in history, there is a remarkable interpretative flexibility when it comes to defining SNF as a 'useful resource' or a form of 'waste' (Högselius 2009 ).
The military roots of Soviet spent nuclear fuel management
Soviet nuclear research started to gain momentum in the 1930s and was at that time civil-oriented and its results were published openly in easily accessible scientific journals. An active experimental study of the inner structure of the atom was initiated at several Soviet laboratories. In 1937 Europe's first cyclotron, built at the Radium Institute in Leningrad, succeeded in generating small volumes of neptunium and plutonium. This can be regarded as the origin of spent nuclear fuel in the Soviet Union.
World War II was linked to a rapid militarization of nuclear research and to increasing secrecy. In spring 1943, when the Germans had already started their retreat, the leading Soviet physicists gathered in Moscow to draw up the lines for the Soviet atomic bomb project. The meeting paved the way for the establishment of a number of secret laboratories. "Laboratory No. 2", which was constructed at the October field in the outskirts of Moscow, became the centre for the bomb project, headed by the country's leading nuclear physicist Kurchatov. Here the Soviets built their first research reactor, "F-1".
Soviet researchers were well aware that there were in principal two known paths to the making of an atomic bomb. The first option was based on the technology of uranium enrichment. The other option was based on plutonium, which was produced in a two-step process: first, natural uranium was irradiated in a reactor, generating spent fuel that contained plutonium. Then this plutonium had to be separated out using chemical methods. The attempts to accomplish the plutonium path would turn out crucial for the later civil management of spent nuclear fuel.
Similarly to the US, the Soviet Union sought to master both methods, but by the time the Smyth report was published, at the latest, the Soviets had come to the conclusion that the plutonium path would be the fastest and cheapest way to the bomb.
1 For the purpose of speeding up research on plutonium production, the famous Russian radiochemist Vitaly G. Khlopin was in 1944 appointed head of a project whose aim was to develop radiochemical production processes for the fabrication of weaponsgrade plutonium.
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It was an extremely difficult engineering task to chemically separate out the plutonium from remaining uranium and other substances in the spent fuel. Later on, this task would be labelled 'reprocessing', but in these early years the aim was not to recover uranium and plutonium for new nuclear fuel production, but to produce plutonium for the bomb. Bradley 1997 p. 104 3 Khlopin, who had initiated radio-chemical research in Russia already before the October Revolution in 1917, had in the mid-1940s at his research institute in Leningrad no access to information about the American methods for producing plutonium on the basis of the irradiated uranium fuel, and it is therefore hardly surprising that the Soviet methods initially diverged in several respects from the American methods. The method that was developed by Khlopin and his colleagues was based on an acetate-lanthanum-fluoride procedure.
connection to the F-1 experimental reactor. Experiments started there in autumn 1946. 4 When it came to large-scale facilities for production of weapons-grade plutonium, the nuclear experts left their basements in Moscow. The government decided in late 1945 that a site for the large-scale plutonium facility should be selected in the Southern Urals.
5 A location was chosen in the vicinity of the old towns of Kyshtym and Kasli in the Chelyabinsk province. There, a nuclear-military complex took form during the following years. At the centre were two key facilities: a scaled-up nuclear reactor that, on the basis of natural uranium, could generate plutonium, and a reprocessing plant that could separate out the plutonium from the spent fuel that had been irradiated in the reactor. Located in the remote Russian countryside, the nuclear centre that grew up was referred to as the 'Mayak Production Association' (with Mayak meaning 'light-house' in Russian). A closed town referred to as Chelyabinsk-40 (later Chelyabinsk-65) developed in the immediate vicinity of the centre.
The plutonium-producing reactor, "Reactor A", was started up at Mayak in June 1948. In the course of the following years, several similar "production reactors", which were to generate plutonium rather than electricity, were built on the same site.
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The reprocessing plant, without which reactor A would have been pointless, was completed in late 1948. The plant came to be known as "Factory B".
7 On 22 December, Soviet engineers, using the methods developed by Khlopin and his radiochemistry colleagues from the Radium Institute, for the first time attempted to dissolve a bunch of spent fuel from Reactor A.
8 By February 1949, the plant had produced its first output of plutonium concentrate. 9 The plutonium enabled the Soviets to build their atomic bomb, paving the way for the first Soviet nuclear explosion on 29 August 1949 at Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan -four years after the American atomic bombs had exploded above Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
As a complement to Mayak, the construction of a second Soviet military-oriented nuclear complex was initiated in March 1949, around ten miles north of Tomsk in central Siberia. Here, as in many other places in the Soviet Union, a whole new city grew up out of nothing, based on a single industrial project. The new, closed town was referred to as . If the Mayak complex can be compared to the Hanford site in the United States, with plutonium production as the main orientation, Tomsk-7 can be said to have formed a Soviet response to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, with its specialization in the production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes. A smaller uranium enrichment facility had been completed as early as 1949 in Novouralsk close to Sverdlovsk (Yekaterinburg), 10 but through the project at Tomsk the enrichment capacity was now substantially expanded. The first section of the enrichment facility was taken into operation in 1953. A conversion facility for the production of UF6 from uranium oxide was also erected in direct connection with 4 Radijevyj Institut 2007; Bradley 1997 p. 104; Egorov et al 2000 p. 147 9 Joint Norwegian-Russian Expert Group 1997 p. 6. The concentrate was transferred to a plant called "V", where it was converted to high-purity metallic plutonium components for the first atomic bomb. 10 Bradley 1997 p. 61 the enrichment facility. Only a few years later the enrichment complex was complemented by military production reactors (subsequently their number grew to five) and an adjacent military reprocessing plant, which was taken into operation in 1961.
11 Tomsk-7 also became a main destination for shipments of recovered uranium from SNF reprocessing, re-enriching it so as to re-insert it into the overall nuclear fuel system.
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In 1950 planning started for a third large military-nuclear complex. It was built further east in Siberia on the banks of the Yenisei, 60 km downstream from the large city of Krasnoyarsk. Again, a small city grew up in connection to the nuclear facilities, . The facilities that were constructed were, similarly to Mayak, oriented towards the production of weapons-grade plutonium, though one of the "production reactors" constructed at the site was later (starting in 1966) used for supplying heat and electricity for inhabitants of Together, Mayak, Tomsk-7 and Kranoyarsk-26 formed the heart of the Soviet nuclear-industrial complex during the entire formative period of the industry, from the late 1940s up to the mid-1960s. The focus was on nuclear reactors, reprocessing plants and enrichment facilities -all with a strong military orientation. Civil nuclear power plants were not yet part of the nuclear fuel system. It was only from the mid1960s that the military orientation started to be complemented by a more civil focus in the form of large-scale civil nuclear facilities for energy production. In contrast to the other major components in the fuel system, civil nuclear reactors were built primarily in the European part of the country.
From military to civil SNF management: exploiting competencies from weaponsgrade plutonium production for civil spent fuel reprocessing
In 1954, the Soviet Union took into commercial operation its first civil nuclear power plant. Located at Obninsk just outside Moscow, its output was no more than 5 MW, but its successful completion was celebrated as a breakthrough for the atom as a 'servant of peace'. In the following period, particularly during Khrushchev's leadership, the civil atomic programme of the Soviet Union started to take concrete shape. As in the West, it was a period of great atomic utopias, with nuclear energy being expected to play a central role not only for energy production, but for societal development in general. Nuclear energy was to be central in building communism. 14 SNF management was at the heart of this development. The reason was that the atomic visions for the future -in the Soviet Union as well as in the West -were based on the idea of a progression through three reactor 'generations': the first generation consisted of the 'thermal' reactors that used uranium as a fuel, whereas the second generation were to consist of 'breeder reactors' that were to use mainly 11 Egorov et al. 2000 p. 155; Joint Norwegian-Russian Expert Group 1997 p. 6. 12 Bradley 1997 p. 61. In 1983 the reprocessing plant at Tomsk-7 was upgraded to a more efficient technology for separating out plutonium and uranium, making it possible, among other things, to close down corresponding military facilities at Mayak, while the volume of radioactive waste from reprocessing was also considerably reduced. See Egorov et al. 2000 p. 155 . 13 Egorov et al 2000. 14 Josephson 2005. plutonium as a fuel, and the 'third generation' were fusion reactors. The fusion reactors were expected to be feasible only in a relatively distant future, but breeder reactors started to be developed early on. The attractive aspect of breeders was that they could use the fuel nearly a hundred times more efficiently than thermal reactors. For this reason, thermal reactors were regarded as 'primitive' -already before they had been taken into large-scale operation! The development of first generation, 'thermal' reactors, of which Obninsk was the first, was seen merely as a first small step on the way to the ultimate socialist nuclear-powered society. A prerequisite for taking the highly efficient breeder reactors into operation, however, was that planners and engineers mastered commercial-scale reprocessing of first generation reactor fuel.
Breeder technology was particularly attractive at a time when the extent of domestic uranium resources was not yet known. Soviet experiences from uranium mining in the 1940s were far from encouraging, since the deposits found were located in very remote and inaccessible places. Hence there was a perceived need to economize on what might turn out to be a very scarce resource.
From this perspective, the experience gained through reprocessing in the military field, i.e. for nuclear weapons production, turned out to be of great value also in the civil context. Already in 1952, the Soviets started to invest in research aimed at extending the military reprocessing competence to the civil sector. 15 The competence rested mainly within the R&D sector, which in contrast to the military-industrial nuclear complexes was geographically concentrated to the European part of the Soviet Union. A number of new R&D units were also incorporated into the civil reprocessing efforts. To the R&D organizations involved in developing civil reprocessing technology belonged not only the laboratories that had been built up for military purposes during the war, but also a large number of R&D and project-design institutes with a mixed military-civil profile, such as VNIPIET in Leningrad (for the design of complex energy projects), the Radium Institute (which was mainly focused on radiochemical research but which with time also came to be an important actor concerning geological repositories for nuclear waste), VNIINM in Moscow (with research on inorganic materials), VNIPIPT (which did research and design for industrial technology) and others.
In autumn 1957, however, in the shadow of the Sputnik triumph, the atomic utopianism faced a seriously blow in the form of a major accident, which was directly related to the reprocessing complex. It took place at Mayak in September 1957, where a storage for low-and medium-active nuclear waste from the radiochemical reprocessing facilities exploded and contaminated the area in a disastrous way.
If this accident would have occurred in the West, it does not seem unlikely that the accident would have made it politically impossible to continue any development in the nuclear energy field. In the Soviet Union, however, the political leadership chose to deny that the accident had taken place, and it remained publicly unknown. Within the nuclear complex, rumours about the accident must have spread, but it was viewed as an anomaly and it could by no means stop the enthusiasm that characterized the Khrushchev era regarding the future of nuclear power. The 1954 triumph of Obninsk was still in fresh memory, and in 1958 the Soviet Union made reality of the dream to use nuclear power for transports: the first generation of nuclear-propelled submarines was launched. Moreover, in 1959 the first atomic-powered icebreaker "Lenin" was taken into operation.
At the same time, development of large-scale nuclear power plants proceeded rapidly, whereby the pilot-scale reactor at Obninsk and the first generation of nuclear submarines became important starting points for defining two long-term technological trajectories in civil nuclear reactor development. 16 Obninsk was a graphite-moderated, water-cooled reactor whose construction built on experiences from the military reactors that were used for plutonium production. This would later lead up to the RBMK concept (Chernobyl-type). The closest neighbour to this variant of reactor type in the Western world is probably the British Magnox concept. 17 The submarine reactors were of a water-cooled, water-moderated type that would lead up to the VVER reactor concept.
18 It was a pressurized water reactor that used lightwater as both coolant and moderator, and it thereby resembled the Western style reactors that were primarily developed in the United States and the basic idea of which was later adopted in most West European nuclear countries.
The RBMK was developed primarily at NIKIET, an R&D institute in Moscow.
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Director of NIKIET was Nikolai Dollezhal, who had earlier among other things been chief engineer for the first Soviet plutonium production reactor at Mayak. With this earlier experience it became natural for Dollezhal to push the development of large civil nuclear power plants for a double purpose: to produce both electricity and plutonium. The later infamous Chernobyl-type reactors thus came to be developed in close relation to the Soviet military-industrial complex.
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In contrast to the RBMK concept, the VVER reactor type had no direct connections to the military-oriented production of plutonium, and in contrast to the SNF from RBMK reactors its spent fuel was not suitable as a resource that could be used for weapons-grade plutonium production.
21
16 See e.g. Nuclear Power in Russia (IAEA?), but in particular Sonja's PhD 17 The most important difference between RBMK and Magnox reactors is that the former ones are water-cooled while the latter are gas-cooled (CO2). 18 20 The first nuclear power plant with this type of reactor was Beloyarsk, 60 km outside Sverdlovsk in the Urals, whose first reactor was connected to the grid in April 1964 -see Josephson 2005 p. 32. The Beloyarsk complex was later followed by several further power plants based on further developments of the same reactor type. The largest were built at Ignalina in Lithuania, whose two reactors, with a capacity of 1500 MWe each, were taken into operation in 1983 and 1987, respectively. 21 The first VVER reactor was taken into operation in 1964 at Novovoronezh in southern Russia. Up to 1972 a total of four reactors were constructed at this site, each one with a modified design. The fourth and last of these reactors had an electric effect of 440 MW and it became the Soviet reactor that resembled Western reactors most. This was a conscious move from Soviet engineers and ideologists, since the Soviets hoped to export this model on global markets, whereby the considered it necessary to adapt to the largest possible extent to Western principles, particularly concerning safety configurations. The Soviets did in the end not succeed in launching any export wave to the West, though they did manage to persuade Finland to procure two reactors that were incorporated into a nuclear power plant where much of the technology, apart from the reactors themselves, came from the West. The VVER reactors were also exported widely to the communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and thus came to form the centrepiece of nuclear power plants from Greifswald in the GDR to Kozloduy in Bulgaria. Many of these reactors are still in operation today and in its most modern form the VVER It was reprocessing of SNF from RBMK and VVER reactors that formed the main area of activity concerning the development of civil reprocessing technologies. In addition, it was considered important to reprocess SNF from submarine reactors and research reactors, since these used highly-enriched uranium that was seen as a valuable resource to be recovered.
RT-1 and the RBMK-VVER tandem system
The 1960s saw the initiation of a first Soviet large-scale civil reprocessing project. It was decided that the facility be built within the up to then military-oriented nuclear complex of Mayak. The facility was named RT-1 and was dimensioned for a capacity of 400 tonnes of spent fuel per year (which roughly corresponded to similar facilities in England and France that were being designed at about the same time).
Mayak was the origin of military reprocessing in the Soviet Union, and RT-1 was related to its military predecessor in a very direct way. The planning of the new facility coincided in time with the decommissioning of the first Soviet (military) reprocessing facility, Factory B, and the idea was to construct the new (civil) facility in the same rooms, so as to utilize the already existing infrastructure. A formal decision in this context was taken in 1966 in the form of a decree from Minsredmash (the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, as the Soviet atomic energy ministry was called at that time) and its long-term minister Yefim Slavsky. 22 The decision was controversial and gave rise to explicit protests from several deputy ministers and representatives of the nuclear industry, who regarded it as much too dangerous and complicated to build a new large reprocessing facility within the Factory B area, since it was heavily contaminated by radioactivity.
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According to Slavsky, however, the need for the facility was urgent, since shipments of spent fuel from nuclear power plants, research institutes, submarines and icebreakers was soon expected to start arriving. The nuclear power plants that were constructed had only very limited interim storage capacities on their territory, and the spent fuel thus had to be sent somewhere else. The volumes of SNF was expected to increase radically during the near future due to the rapid expansion of civil nuclear power, and in addition large amounts of plutonium would soon be needed due to the launch of breeder reactors. Reprocessing was thus a crucial task. The scattered protests remained unheard, and RT-1 could start to be constructed in 1968 on top of the decommissioned military reprocessing plant, with the argument that this particular arrangement would save both time and resources.
Minsredmash delegated the main responsibility for developing the reprocessing project to the large R&D institute VNIIMN in Moscow. In the course of the process, a whole array of other institutes also came to be involved, particularly in connection to the appearance of unexpected technical problems during the design phase. As a result, the Radium Institute in Leningrad, among others, was incorporated into the technology has, in contrast to the RBMK technology, generally a fairly good reputation globally. See Högselius 2005. 22 Slavsky was Minister of Medium Machine Building from 1957 to 1986. 23 Larin 2001; Bellona 2004 p. 51. project, with its long experience regarding radiochemistry. 24 The institute even carried out actual reprocessing of spent fuel on an experimental scale, seeking ways to improve the methods and adapt the military processes to civil needs. The efforts were aimed at developing a Soviet version of the 'PUREX' technology that was being developed in the West. Obviously the Soviets judged that their traditional precipitation-oriented reprocessing technology, which had so far been used for military purposes, was inferior to the Western tradition of liquid extraction. 25 A centre for research on chemical treatment of SNF was established for this purpose at Gatchina near Leningrad. 26 In 1972, four years after the construction start, RT-1 was ready to receive its first spent fuel shipment. The plant was equipped with a spent fuel storage pond, with a capacity of 400 tonnes, i.e. a year's load, and was divided into three cutting and dissolution sections. Most of the fuel originated in nuclear power plants with VVER reactors, but the facility was subsequently adapted so that it could also reprocess fuel from submarine and research reactors.
It took several years, however, before reprocessing on an industrial scale could actually start at Mayak. Following a long period of difficult pilot-scale operation, the facility's first section was taken into regular operation only in winter 1977. Its capacity was then 60-70 tonnes of uranium. When the second part was taken into operation the annual capacity of the plant rose to 150-200 tonnes.
In the third and last section of the facility, the plan was for the capacity to be extended to 400 tonnes, whereby it would also be possible to reprocess RMBK fuel. But while Mayak was busy completing the facility's two first sections, new technical and economic investigations carried out within Minsredmash provided hints that the RBMK technology would not be competitive on the nuclear power market on the long term. It appeared that the VVER path was much more promising for the future.
This had consequences for the SNF management regime and for development works at Mayak. If the RBMK concept was not to be further pursued, then it seemed much less purposeful to invest in costly reprocessing technology for spent fuel from these reactors. RBMK SNF was also less attractive than VVER SNF due to its lower degree of original enrichment, since a more highly-enriched SNF made the uranium regained from the reprocessing more valuable as a resource for new fuel production.
27 Against this background, it seemed more advisable to use the third section of RT-1 for reprocessing of VVER fuel rather than RBMK fuel. The issue continued to be vividly debated, however, and concrete decisions were postponed. Hence, the construction of the third section of RT-1 was also delayed. This development did not mean, however, that the RBMK concept lost its relevance in the overall nuclear fuel system. On the contrary, following the inauguration of RT-1, RBMK fuel came to fill an important function in the Soviet fuel system. Since RBMK reactors were designed for the use of very low-enriched uranium, the Soviets found it suitable to use recycled uranium from spent VVER fuel as a basis for the 24 Lazarev 1997 p. 36 25 This is discussed in Bradley p. 108 26 Radiyevyi Institut 2007. 27 Interviews... Rybalchenko et al… Anderson et al… see also Kuznetsov and Nazarov 2006 p. 449. production of fresh RBMK fuel. The uranium that was recovered from spent VVER fuel had, of course, a lower share of U-235 than before its irradiation, but the share of U-235 was still high enough (or almost high enough) for it to function as new fuel in RBMK reactors. To reach a suitable level of enrichment, the recovered uranium from spent VVER fuel was mixed with a certain amount of recovered uranium from spent submarine or research reactor fuel, which was much more highly enriched than VVER fuel. 28 The advantage with this arrangement was that the enrichment stage could be skipped in the re-fabrication of RBMK fuel; the uranium mix could go directly from reprocessing to fuel element production. To be able to utilize recovered uranium in reactors that were designed for a higher enrichment degree, however, the Soviets had to let the fuel go through a renewed enrichment. This was a task that the enrichment plant at Tomsk-7 came to specialize in.
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Apart from using recovered uranium from reprocessed VVER and submarine fuel for the manufacturing of RBMK fuel, Soviet engineers also started to use recovered uranium from RT-1 for the 'breeding mantle' in breeder reactors. The first large-scale breeder reactor, BN-350, was taken into operation in 1973, and a second, larger unit was also on its way. Here, as a matter of fact, it was actually an advantage if the recovered uranium was not enriched [explain] .
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When RT-1 was taken into use in 1977, the Soviet Union had already taken a substantial number of large civil nuclear power plants into operation. … Statistics on these… apart from that, as already mentioned, a considerable export of reactors to Central and Eastern Europe and to Finland had been launched. By 1976 a total of xxx Soviet reactors had been taken into operation in these countries, and during the following years xxx further reactors were to be taken into operation. The fuel supply for these was in all cases part of the procurement of the nuclear power plants themselves and was based on a scheme with the Soviet Union "leasing" VVER fuel to the foreign nuclear power plant operators. Conversion, enrichment and manufacture of fuel elements hence took place in the Soviet Union, and when the fuel had been irradiated in the foreign reactors it was to be sent back to the east, after a few years of cooling in special water pools close to the reactors. The spent fuel was transported by railway to Mayak, where it was placed in temporary dry storages awaiting reprocessing.
With the continuing expansion of the nuclear industry, however, it was obvious that RT-1 would by no means be sufficient for meeting future needs in terms of reprocessing of large amounts of spent fuel from reactors that were ever larger. In 1974 the first 1000 MW RBMK-reactor was taken into operation at the Sosnovy Bor nuclear power plant on the shore of the Finnish Gulf, and in 1981 the first 1000 MW VVER reactor was taken into operation at Novo-Voronezh in southern Russia. 31 In this perspective, RT-1 increasingly appeared as a pilot-scale facility rather than a fullfledged reprocessing plant, and it would inevitably have to be followed by substantially larger radiochemical factories.
Considering this development, Minsredmash decided in 1976 to start construction of a much larger facility for reprocessing spent fuel from civil nuclear power plants. 32 The new facility, "RT-2", was dimensioned for 1500 tonnes of uranium per year (roughly corresponding to the French and British facilities UP-2 and THORP, respectively). It was to be built at Krasnoyarsk-26, the easternmost of the three large (originally military) nuclear complexes in the Soviet Union. Here the idea was above all to reprocess spent fuel from the new reactor type VVER-1000, for which the Soviets held high hopes. It was regarded as the main conventional reactor for the future, on the basis of which most of the nuclear expansion in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, along with the taking into operation of breeder reactors, was expected to take place from the 1980s onwards.
Minsredmash charged the Radium Institute in Leningrad, together with VNIPIET, to head the scientific-technical design and launch of this facility. An enterprise with the acronym SverdNIIKhIMMash, based in Sverdlovsk, got the main responsibility for manufacturing machines and equipment. The Soviets were also keen to use the new opportunities within electronics, whereby the important Central Design Bureau for Machine Construction (TsKBM, based in Leningrad) got the task of developing a special control system for distance handling of the spent fuel elements.
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Apart from the reprocessing facilities themselves, methods for transporting the spent fuel over thousands of kilometres were developed during these years. This was not a simple task, given the risks of radioactive leakages and contamination. To cope with such problems, specially designed railway cars were developed. The first ones, TK-NV and TK-AMB, were manufactured in Leningrad and started to be used in connection with the inauguration of RT-1 at Mayak. They were based on domestic Soviet experiences and seem not to have drawn on corresponding R&D results in the West. 34 With time, the design for transport of spent fuel from reactors of the type VVER-440 (wagon model TK-6), VVER-1000 (TK-10) and RBMK (TK-11) was improved. In connection with the decision to refrain from reprocessing of RBMK fuel, the TK-11 wagons started to be used, instead, for transporting spent breeder reactor fuel to RT-1. In the mid-1980s the newer version TK-13 was added for VVER-1000 fuel.
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The stagnation in breeder reactor development as a decisive trend Just like analogous facilities in Western Europe and the United States, the Soviet reprocessing plants were built foreseeing a rapidly increasing demand for plutonium, i.e. in breeder reactors. 36 Breeder reactor development was pursued with great enthusiasm within the Soviet nuclear community, and by 1980, two large pilot-scale breeder reactors had already been taken into operation: one BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan and one BN-600 reactor at Beloyarsk in Russia. At about the same time planning started for a breeder reactor complex to be built at Mayak, consisting of three large BN-800 reactors. In this connection the plutonium extraction facility at 32 Perera 1997 vol Kuznetsov and Nazarov p. 430f . 36 The perception of reactor generations has shifted over time, and nowadays we find breeder reactors under the heading 'Generation IV'. See Högselius forthcoming RT-1 was also adapted for the production of a mixed uranium-plutonium fuel (with 5-25% plutonium content) to be used in breeder reactors. 37 A facility for the production of this MOX fuel started to be built, designed for an annual throughput of six tonnes of plutonium. Similar MOX facilities started to be planned for But breeder reactor development was in reality crisis-ridden. The Beloyarsk breeder reactor saw several major accidents during its first few years of operation, the most serious one of which took place in December 1978, when a machine-room ceiling collapsed, initiating a series of events that made one of the reactors go out of control. There had also been leakages of radioactive liquid sodium.
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At an IAEA conference in 1982, a group of Soviet engineers acknowledged that they faced considerable problems in the development of breeder technology, a trend was predicted to lead to big delays in taking into operation of breeder reactors on a larger scale. 40 The need for plutonium was thereby predicted to increase at a more moderate rate than earlier anticipated, which according to the Soviet researchers was the reason for a certain stagnation in reprocessing at Mayak. Delays were also evident with the construction of RT-2 at Zheleznogorsk.
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It appears likely, however, that this was a mere pretext for internal problems at Mayak. Experiences that started to be gathered from full-scale industrial reprocessing were not very positive, with a whole array of unanticipated problems. And the decision regarding whether the third and largest section of RT-1 was to be used for spent RBMK fuel, as originally planned, or rather rebuilt for VVER fuel processing, was still pending. 42 At the same time new uranium deposits were discovered, making reprocessing for uranium economizing purposes less imperative.
The slow development regarding reprocessing meant that Mayak continued to be reluctant when it came to receiving new shipments of spent fuel from reactors across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It led to considerable irritation from the side of those nuclear power plants that operated VVER-440 reactors. These were now instructed by Moscow to start construction of extra interim storage capacities. 43 Historically, the VVER reactor blocks had been constructed with a cooling pond in direct connection to the reactor, with a capacity corresponding to about three years of fuel consumption plus extra space for a full fuel load. 44 The regular Soviet policy had been that the spent fuel should cool down in these ponds for three years only, before being transported from the nuclear plants to Mayak. 45 This policy was now changed so that nuclear power plants were forced to prolong this period to at least five years, stressing that this was an absolute minimum. What was demanded was therefore larger interim storage capacities in separate buildings that could accommodate fuel for up to ten years consumption. Hence from around 1980, large interim storage facilities started to be constructed at most VVER power plants both in the Soviet Union itself and in those East European countries -and Finland -that operated Soviet reactors. At the Finnish site, for example, a new interim storage facility was taken into operation in 1985. 46 in Czechoslovakia a centralized interim storage facility was created for all three Czechoslovak nuclear power sites -Bohunice, Dukovany och Mochovce -with a total of no less than 12 reactors.
47
For spent fuel from VVER-1000 reactors, the dilemma regarding lack of interim storage capacity was solved in a different way. The design of the reprocessing complex RT-2 at Zheleznogorsk, where VVER-1000 fuel was to be reprocessed in the future, included a large storage for incoming SNF with a capacity of no less than 3000 tonnes. Whereas the construction of RT-2 itself slowed down in the mid-1980s, this interim storage facility adjacent to it was ready at a relatively early stage, being taken into operation in 1985.
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Towards direct disposal of RBMK spent fuel
While VVER fuel continued to be subject to reprocessing, the stagnation in the field of breeder technology and the increasing availability of uranium resources seemed to confirm the earlier suspicion that RBMK reprocessing would be pointless. At least for the moment, it was seen as uneconomic to reprocess the spent RBMK fuel. 49 The strategy was to wait and see.
In the meantime, each RBMK power plant was equipped with an interim storage for spent fuel, located in a separate building on the power plant area. The spent fuel was transported to this facility after having cooled for a few years in ponds connected to the reactors. Here the idea was initially that the fuel was to be stored during a ten-year period. There were not yet any clear ideas about what would happen to the fuel after that. 50 Later on a strategy emerged foreseeing the creation of very large regional interim storage facilities for RBMK fuel, to which SNF from several RBMK plants would be sent and where the SNF would then be stored for 30-40 years. By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, these regional facilities had not yet been constructed.
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On the long-term, the likely non-reprocessing of RBMK SNF meant that the Soviets were for the first time forced to take on the issue of direct disposal of SNF. In this regard, the Soviet Union were in practice linking up with the general trend in the world during these years, with countries such as the United States, Sweden and Finland increasingly becoming interested in direct disposal as the overarching SNF management strategy -although the motivation for this strategy differed between 46 Kuznetsov and Nazarov p. 423; Bradley p. 91. 47 CZ article + Bradley p. 91. Bradley cites futher storages as follows: Paks 1-4 in Hungary, capacity 600 MT (service date unknown); Novovoronezh 1-5, 600 MT, service date unknown but reported operational in 1986; Kozloduy 1-6 in Bulgaria, 600 MT, service date early 1980s; Greifswald in GDR, 600 MT, service date unknown (check my own book on Greifswald!). 48 East and West. The Soviet Union seemed to be on its way towards a combination of a closed and an open nuclear fuel system, where only RBMK fuel -which was often 'second generation' fuel that stemmed from reprocessing of VVER fuel -could possibly be subject to direct disposal.
Emerging R&D activities around direct disposal were integrated into the already ongoing research on disposal of long-lived and highly radioactive nuclear waste. "Nuclear waste" was in Soviet terminology completely different from "spent nuclear fuel", since the latter was still being seen as a valuable resource.
52 But in practice, when it came to development of methods for disposal -at least regarding solid waste -there were many overlapping problems. Any joint SNF and waste strategy from the side of the nuclear industry in this respect did not yet exist, but several important research institutes and other organizations were interested in the issue. To these belonged among others the large research and design institute for industrial technology in Moscow (VNIPIPT), the Radium Institute in Leningrad, the omnipresent energy project institute VNIPIET in the same city and the Geophysical Institute of the Urals at Sverdlovsk. A number of institutions belonging under the Academy of Sciences were also involved.
Geological investigations for permanent storage of radioactive waste had been initiated already during the 1960s at several places around the vast country, whereby Soviet researchers had become particularly interested in possible repositories in direct connection to some of the three large nuclear complexes in the Urals and Siberia. Investigations on these places became urgent and imperative as very large volumes of radioactive waste -particularly fluid waste -were produced in connection to reprocessing of SNF from military reactors. 53 This concerned in particular Mayak, where the production of weapons plutonium during the first critical phase of the 1940s and 1950s had been considered so decisive for the country's defence capacity that the Soviets at several occasions had dumped large amounts of fluid radioactive waste directly into nearby lakes and rivers, so that the production of plutonium would not be forced to a stand-still due to lack of storage space in containers. 54 A number of natural lakes close to the Mayak site were utilized as reservoirs for radioactive waste from military reprocessing, and this was true also for the Techa river. 55 It was obvious that this type of 'solution' did not provide any suitable basis for the long-term development of the nuclear complex, and it was in this connection that the possibilities concerning geological repositories started to be investigated more carefully and systematically. Soviet researchers developed a whole array of interesting methods, of which the clearly most important became so-called injection of fluid waste into sub-terrestrial cavities. This method, which was developed by VNIPIPT and the Institute for Physical Chemistry, was formally recognized by the Soviet government in the 1960s. During a period from 1963 onwards, the Soviet Union thereby disposed of no less than 50 million cubic metres of fluid waste, 52 E.g. Gupalo 2006 . 53 Reprocessing of 1 tonne of VVER fuel thus generated 45 m3 of HLW (>1 Ci/l), 150 m3 ILW (0.00001-1 Ci/l) and 2000 m3 LLW (<0.00001 Ci/l). At the same time 1000 kg of HLW (>0.1 Ci/kg), 3000 kg of ILW (0.001-0.1 Ci/kg) and 3500 kg of LLW (<0.001 Ci/kg) were produced. See Bradley p. 104 and Kuznetsov and Nazarov p. 416f. 54 See e.g. Bradley 1997 p. 378. 55 Joint Norwegian-Russian Expert Group 1997 corresponding to around half of all radioactive nuclides that had been produced within the military programme of the nuclear industry. This was regarded as a great success, since the injection method made it possible to avoid the risky storage of radioactive waste close to the surface of the ground. When a suitable location for the new reprocessing facility RT-2 was to be selected, a major condition was precisely that the location was to be suitable for injection of radioactive waste into the ground.
56
The injection method, however, could only be used in certain geological areas; it proved possible to use it at Krasnoyarsk-26 and Tomsk-7, but not at Mayak, which lacked suitable bedrock. 57 The issue that was regarded as most problematic for the future was therefore waste management at Mayak, with its multiplicity of nuclear facilities that had been built in a haste in the immediate post-war nuclear race. The lack of suitable geological formations for injection at Mayak stimulated Soviet efforts to develop solidification and vitrification technologies as an alternative way of taking care of the fluid waste from reprocessing.
Concerning solid waste, research was carried out focusing on several geological alternatives, including a possible storage in deep bore holes. For certain long-lived nuclides -e.g. Tc-99, Np-237, I-129 and Zr-93 -a disposal in outer space was seen as possible or even probable. 58 This method was seen by some as the only 'real' solution to the waste issue.
59 However, such a solution was obviously dependent upon a continued progress of reprocessing of SNF, since the nuclides in question would first have to be separated out from other substances in the spent fuel, particularly uranium and plutonium.
Concerning the geological alternatives for final disposal of solid waste, the Soviet Union started in the 1980s to define criteria for site selection, which seems first and foremost to have been technical in character, with the exception of the desire for finding suitable geological formations in reasonable proximity of the nuclear complexes that produced the long-lived waste, e.g. Mayak.
60 As a matter of fact, the large research institute VNIPIPT hade already in the late 1970s, in connection with inauguration of the reprocessing plant RT-1, been assigned the task to start complex investigations for assessing the suitability of a possible deep geological repository for radioactive waste at Mayak. 61 Most suitable, from a geological point of view, were found to be certain volcanic rocks.
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When the construction of RT-2 started, the interest grew in deep repositories in the large granite massifs east of the Yenisei, close to the nuclear complex at Krasnoyarsk-26. These investigations were led by researchers from the Radium Institute, whose activities in this area had been initiated in the early 1970s through a cooperation with East German researchers. The GDR was regarded as highly interesting due to the East Germans' advanced studies that were carried out at the former salt mine of Morsleben, just on the West German border. The activities of the Radium Institute in this area grew quickly, and researchers from the institute contributed thereby also to the working out of IAEA criteria for storage of radioactive waste in geological formations.
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In 1987 it was reported that the Soviet Union was first and foremost interested in salt and granite as possible host rocks, whereby the Soviets were investigating a number of possible locations. 64 Initially the work was focused on salt domes in proximity of the Caspian Sea. Rather soon, however, these proved unsuitable, due to the discovery that the area was characterized by a too complex tectonic structure, among other things with centres of earlier earthquakes.
65 This contributed to a strengthened focus on possible locations close to Mayak and Zheleznogorsk's large nuclear combines.
Towards the end of the 1980s the Soviet researchers could look back upon a period of considerable progress concerning the geological investigations that had been carried out in preparation for the possible construction of a deep geological repository. The development was sometimes a bit slow, and most of R&D activities had still largely the character of basic research in order to better understand the properties of the bedrock, so there was still a long way to go. But when the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, Russia and to some extent the other union republics could to draw on a substantial experience from the Soviet era. This experience concerned officially only the management of nuclear waste and not spent nuclear fuel, since the Soviet Union still -at least when communicating with the public -proclaimed that all spent fuel was to be reprocessed. The fact that the Soviets, as a result of the nonreprocessing of RBMK spent fuel, in reality already applied a semi-open nuclear fuel system, was never acknowledged in the technopolitical discourse. In official documents the Soviets continued to simply note that it was 'for the moment' not regarded as profitable to reprocess RBMK fuel. But in practice the experiences from the geologically oriented R&D activities in the nuclear waste area were still of great value also for a possible direct disposal solution of SNF.
Chernobyl, glasnost and the anti-nuclear movement
The death of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in 1982 marked the end of a long era that within the nuclear sector was linked to a large-scale expansion in several dimensions. Although the Khrushchev-era utopian visions about a nuclear energy society had cooled down somewhat, the Soviet Union had under Brezhnev's leadership actually taken into operation an impressive number of large civil nuclear power plants, of which two breeder reactors seemed to point to the future. Fusion research, too, was progressing. The Soviets had, moreover, taken into use a civil reprocessing plant, RT-1, and had mastered new enrichment technologies. They had learnt to use the inner power of the atom for transports, in the form of a hundred or so (?) atomic-powered submarines and icebreakers. Soviet nuclear power plants on land, for their part, produced not only electricity, but also district heating for a large number of cities and towns. And last but not least, the Soviet Union was in the possession of a terrifying arsenal of nuclear weapons. From this perspective, the Brezhnev era had indeed become a 'nuclear age'. 63 Anderson & Savonenkov 1997 p. 127 64 Bradley 1997 p. 197 65 Atomnaya Energiya 1991 As shown in the preceding section, however, the Soviet nuclear industry also faced an obvious stagnation in a variety of areas, particularly with respect to the long-term delays in the breeder reactor field and the questioning of the economically optimal in pursuing reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. At the same time, the nuclear complex cast increasingly dark shadows in the form of accidents and radioactive contamination of the environment, with disease and loss of human life as a result.
Throughout the Brezhnev era, it was only an inner circle within the Party apparatus and nuclear industry that was aware of the extent of radioactive contamination and nuclear accidents that had occurred. The environmental dimension of the nuclear sector had not been allowed to be discussed publicly and no formal non-governmental environmental organizations existed. This did not mean, however, that environmental concerns related to nuclear issues did not exist. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the environmental movement got, to its own surprise, increased possibilities to raise its voice. Glasnost, Gorbachev's plea for a new openness, was utilized effectively by nuclear critics. In smaller republics with nuclear facilities, such as Lithuania and Armenia, but also in the much larger Ukraine, the protests against new nuclear power plants even became a point of departure for national liberation movements.
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Decisive for the success of the Soviet anti-nuclear movement in the late 1980s was the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986. The horrific explosion in Ukraine caused a moratorium on further nuclear projects in the Soviet Union as a whole, 67 while also leading to loud demands for publicizing earlier nuclear accidents in the country. When the government in 1989 for the first time officially confirmed that a disastrous radioactive explosion had occurred at Mayak more than forty years earlier, this had far-reaching consequences for ongoing projects within the Mayak complex as well as within the other Siberian nuclear industrial complexes. Regional and local authorities took a more critical stance to Mayak than before. Lobbied effectively by the growing anti-nuclear movement, the local authorities requested a slow-down in reprocessing at RT-1, limiting it to 250 tonnes per year. 68 Similarly, in 1988 the construction of a BN-800 breeder reactor that had begun at the Beloyarsk NPP close to Sverdlovsk only a year before was brought to a standstill following public protests.
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Another important target for the growing anti-nuclear movement was the much larger reprocessing plant RT-2, which was still under construction at Krasnoyarsk-26. The construction had, as already mentioned, stagnated already in the early 1980s following the slow-down in the breeder reactor field. Arguments had been raised already at that time for abandoning the project, but a number of powerful actors within the nuclear complex lobbied for the plant to be completed. The Radium Institute, for example, argued that the excess plutonium that was accumulating following the stagnation in breeders could, instead, be used for the production of MOX fuel. The actual result, before Gorbachev, was a compromise: the construction of RT-2 continued, but only at half-speed. By 1989, the new reprocessing facility had then been completed to around 30%, but further construction was now totally interrupted -for reasons that with hindsight have been interpreted differently by different actors. The anti-nuclear movement regarded it as a result of its own intense anti-nuclear campaigns in Siberia. The government, however, explained that the real reason for the interruption was lack of finance. 71 In a wider perspective, one rather gets the impression the decision not to prioritize the plant was a natural consequence of the fact that most of nuclear power plant construction, including VVER-1000 power plants, whose fuel was to be reprocessed at RT-2, was interrupted after Chernobyl, at the same time as there was hardly any new light in the tunnel concerning breeder reactor projects. When the Soviet Union was dissolved and the Cold War approached an end, the need for plutonium was further reduced as a consequence of a stagnation in nuclear weapons production. In January 1991 the leadership of Minsredmash, which at that time had been renamed Minatom, decided to "conserve" the RT-2 construction for a five-year-period, after which it was thought that its further fate was to be decided once and for all.
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While the civil reprocessing complex thus experienced a radical decline in the Gorbachev era, the military nuclear complex also stagnated. Here the main driving force were the new disarmament policies. Several military reprocessing plants and plutonium production reactors at Mayak, Tomsk-7 and Krasnoyarsk-26 were shut down. The last weapons-grade plutonium at Mayak was produced in 1991. 73 The enterprise increasingly directed its technical potential towards non-military applications 74 Civil reprocessing, however, also declined. The formal limit imposed by regional authorities regarding its productivity was quite unnecessary, since financial problems under the economic chaos in the last few years of the Soviet Union's existence made it economically impossible to keep the facility operating at full capacity. As a result, the throughput of RT-1declined from 200 tonnes in 1990 to 170 tonnes in 1991 and 120 tonnes in 1992. 75 The same trend characterized breeder developments at the same site: in 1992 the construction of the three breeder reactors at Mayak that had been going on for many years was terminated due to lack of finance.
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Nuclear disarmament, however, gave rise to new challenges in terms of SNF management. When nuclear submarines were decommissioned, their spent fuel had to be taken care of in one way or the other… [continues] Epilogue: Trends in post-Soviet SNF management
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 threw the red empire's nuclear industry into a new era. A thorough analysis of the twists and turns in the chaotic post-Soviet years are beyond the scope of this paper, but a few general trends ought to be mentioned. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of several new independent countries with nuclear power plants generated completely new problems concerning SNF management. What had until then been domestic procedures governed by Moscow collapsed or were transformed into complex international arrangements for the transfer of SNF from reactors in Ukraine, Armenia, Lithuania and Kazakhstan. Managing this new situation was not an easy task. Russian president Boris Yeltsin decided that 'foreign nuclear waste' was not welcome in Russia, but since nuclear waste in Soviet language was different from spent nuclear fuel, it remained unclear how this new stance would influence the fuel arrangements. The trend that gradually emerged was one of Russia being prepared to accept spent fuel from former Soviet republics and from Finland and Eastern Europe, though at much higher prices than before (1200-1300 USD/kg was one figure that was mentioned).
77 Several countries found it necessary to look for new SNF strategies, particularly at a time when the future of Russia and its nuclear industry was highly uncertain.
At Rovno NPP in Ukraine, with three VVER-type reactors in operation (a fourth one had been suspended when 75% complete due to moratorium of 1986), SNF storage facilities were quickly becoming full after the old SNF transport arrangement broke down in the post-Soviet chaos. As an alternative, the plant decided to purchase new SNF interim racks from Skoda in Czechoslovakia; these should provide an additional five years of storage. 78 In Armenia, completely new problems arose for the SNF transport to Mayak due to the military conflicts in the Caucasian region, which made it difficult to find a safe transport route to the envisaged reprocessing at Mayak. Given the stagnation in the transport that followed, Armenia sought cooperation with the French nuclear company Framatome, which in early 1996 won a contract for the construction of a dry storage unit at the Armenian NPP.
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The new, free status of the Central and East European countries that operated Sovietdesigned nuclear power plants influenced SNF arrangements in similar ways. In Slovakia one part of the solution was even to extend the operating lives of fuel elements in the reactor from 4 to 5 years starting in 2006, so as to reduce storage costs. 80 Moreover, with the new market economy system, reprocessing at Mayak faced serious problems as the NPPs often proved unwilling or unable to pay for the reprocessing services (although the fees were much lower than those charged in Western countries). Similarly the Russian navy was unable to cover reprocessing costs at Mayak. In addition, the navy was unable to pay the railway charges for its transport. Mayak was thus about to lose its traditional customers. As a radical new strategy, the nuclear industry started to consider the idea of seeking customers from Western Europe, North America or Asia. So far, however, these attempts have largely failed.
A positive trend in the post-Soviet era was the strong international interest in assisting the Soviet Union with managing its radioactive legacy. This related above all to the military sector, the problems of which by far overshadowed any civil activities. 77 Nuclear Fuel, 9 July 1990. 78 Perera 1997 p. 76 . 79 Perera 1997 p. 94. 80 IEA 2006 Opinions often differed, however, about strategic choices. The most pressing problem was the excess availability of (military) plutonium. Not wishing to abandon the old Soviet dream of breeder reactors as the ultimate future, Russian scientists preferred to see the solution to the military plutonium legacy in such reactors, arguing that three BN-800 reactors could 'consume all Russia's weapons-grade plutonium in 10 years'. The US arms control community, however, favoured vitrifcation -i.e. containment of the plutonium in glassified high-level wastes -pointing to the worldwide shortage of capacity to fabricate MOX fuel, and fears of diversion by terrorists. There were signs that the US might be softening this opposition to MOX in October 1996 during a meeting of nuclear experts in Paris.
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The trend towards a strong anti-nuclear movement that had been so remarkable in the years around 1990 was reversed starting in the late Yeltsin period and above all during the Putin era. Following the economic collapse in the early 1990s, other, seemingly more acute problems came to be prioritized by both politicians and the public. In the first democratic elections in Russian in 1993, the 'green' parties only got a very small percentage of votes. The largest one, Cedar (The Ecological Union of Russia) got merely 0.76% of the votes. 82 In 1996, moreover, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources was downgraded from a "ministry" to a "state committee".
The Russian nuclear industry, after a few years of opposition from a variety of groups, got an opportunity to re-establish itself as a progressive and future-looking force in post-Soviet society. The defensive stance that had characterized the first postChernobyl decade gradually changed and was replaced by a new progressive spirit strongly reminiscent of the visionary era of the 1950s and 1960s. 83 Among other things, the moratorium imposed in 1991 on the finalization of RT-2 was lifted. Minatom looked for cooperation with Korea and Taiwan… (?)… While awaiting the completion of the facility, however, the interim storage that had been taken into operation on the site in 1985 continued to be filled through new shipments of spent VVER 1000 fuel. By 1995 it had been filled with 1000 tonnes of SNF. At the same time, the capacity of the facility, originally 3000 tonnes, was expanded to 6000 ton. 84 By January 2004, 70% of the 6000 tonnes were full, and by that time a further expansion had been initiated, to 9000 tonnes. 85 The new storage space, however, was not to be used primarily for VVER fuel, but rather for RBMK fuel, initially from the Sosnovy Bor and Kursk NPPs. A similar trend towards increasing interim storage capacity could be discerned at Mayak.
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Works also proceeded for expanding interim storage capacities for RBMK fuel. At the Smolensk NPP, with three RBMK-1000 reactors, a new store was completed and taken into operation in December 1995 after five years of construction. The Russianbuilt store would hold the spent fuel for 30 years pending definite decisions to be 81 Perera 1997 p. 109 82 Ziegler and Lyon p. 37. The party that in practice started to put the strongest emphasis on environmental issues was, in the absence of more explicitly environmental parliamentary fractions, the liberal party Yabloko, with Grigory Yavlinsky as leader. 83 Josephson 2003 . 84 Bradley p. 474. 85 Kuznetsov and Nazarov p. 428 86 WANO Russia article taken concerning its eventual fate. 87 At the Sosnovy Bor plant, with four RBMK-1000 units, an R&D project for devising a new storage system was initiated in cooperation with defence ministry bureaux and various research institutes. Containers were being developed which would permit either on-site storage or transport elsewhere. 88 For the Kursk NPP, with four RBMK units, a contract was signed with the German company Gesellschaft für Nuklear-Behälter (GNB), a subsidiary of Nukem, to build a storage facility and provide 240 containers to store and transport the plant's radioactive waste. The facility was to operate for 50 years. 89 At the Lithuanian Ignalina NPP, a cooperation was initiated with the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. (SKB), with SKB providing Ignalina with 'the world's first dry store for RBMK spent fuel' using containers made by the German GNB.
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Corruption became a major problem for SNF management. In January 2003, for example, the supervisory authority Gosatomnadzor withdrew Mayak's reprocessing license, with the motivation that the facility had not been able to protect the water systems in its surroundings. This gave rise to substantial public attention, but Mayak quickly regained its licence following the firing of Gosatomnadzor director Yuri Vishnevsky and the arrival of a new director, Andrei Malyshev, who had earlier been deputy minister at Minatom.
91 Mayak continued to be criticized, however, and in February 2006 the environmental committee of the Duma adopted a resolution foreseeing a gradual decline of reprocessing at Mayak.
Thus, in the early 21st century the overall trend in post-Soviet SNF management was a stagnation in reprocessing combined with an increased focus on expanding interim storage capacities for both VVER and RBMK fuel, but without any clear indications that direct disposal might be acknowledged as an alternative SNF strategy. These issues, however, were regarded as quite minor relatively to the enormous task of managing the military nuclear legacy from the Soviet era and in particular disposing of the large quantities of weapons-grade plutonium that had accumulated during the Cold War. Today, it is hardly possible to discern any clear and stable strategy for SNF management in Russia. The political strategy documents that have been developed are viewed by many observers with a certain degree of scepticism, since they contain ambitions that seem financially unrealistic. This is particularly so after it turned out too difficult to generate income by way of importing SNF from abroad. The official documents are, moreover, rather diffuse, and this is particularly so regarding spent RBMK fuel management, where the dominant stance still seems to be "wait and see". This does not prevent, however, the carrying out of intensive activities concerning in particular research on reprocessing and geological repositories, which deserve to be taken seriously. 87 Perera 1997 
Conclusion
What can we learn from the story told in this paper? First of all, it is interesting to see the Soviet developments in the field of SNF management in relation to developments elsewhere in the world. To what extent was the Soviet development special or exceptional? The Soviet SNF development paths did not necessarily diverge as much from Western developments as one might expect given the very different historical points of departure and the different political settings in the Cold War era. For example, the stagnation in reprocessing from the 1970s was not an isolated Soviet phenomenon, but parallel developments in the United States, France, Britain, Germany and elsewhere faced a similar stagnation at about the same time. Similarly, although anti-nuclear groupings were not allowed to emerge to any notable extent in the Brezhnev era, once they were acknowledged in the Gorbachev era they took a decisive influence on SNF developments in a way reminiscent of corresponding developments in the West. Moreover, the military roots of reprocessing as the basic SNF management strategy is largely analogous to that of the other nuclear weapons countries -although the links between the military and the civil nuclear industry, while loosening somewhat in the West, continued to be very tight in the Soviet Union up to its demise in 1991 and continue to be tight in today's Russia.
The environmental destruction resulting from SNF management, however, clearly appears to have been much more serious than in the Western world, judging from reports published in the immediate post-Soviet years. Much of this destruction took place already during the very early years of managing SNF, i.e. in the 1940s and 1950s, when the focus was purely military. Indirectly this environmental destruction can be interpreted as a result of the cold war arms race, as reflected, for example, in the hurried enforced solution in the context of reprocessing to release liquid waste directly into river systems in the Chelyabinsk region.
There are no reliable figures available on how much the Soviet Union, in total, invested in SNF management compared to other large nuclear nations. However, the enormous multiplicity of R&D organizations involved in SNF issues testifies of enormous resources devoted to the field -in a way which does not seem to correspond to the much lower number of nuclear power plants in the Soviet Union than, for example, the United States, France or Japan. By 1991 a total of 43 large commercial reactors had been taken into operation in the Soviet Union. The bias can probably be best explained by a much more intensive focus on the military side of plutonium production and the needs occurring in this context regarding disposal of waste from military reprocessing for plutonium production.
An interesting expression of the importance of the military side is the organizational blurring of military and civil nuclear activities within the same organization, Minsredmash (later renamed Minatom), which was a combined civil-military ministry.
In the chaotic post-Soviet context, SNF management was hit hard by the sudden withdrawal of funding for much of its activities. No dedicated funds accumulated over time for the future handling of SNF had been organized in the Soviet Union. This seems to illustrate the importance of such instruments in Western countries, most of which have implemented schemes that force nuclear operators to put aside a certain percentage of their income to future SNF handling. Seeing this type of instrument in the Soviet context suggests that such funds might serve to strengthen stability in the event of political revolutions.
